Traffic Confirmation in Open Environments

An improvement over the previously known disclosuTe attack is pre­ sented that allows, using statistical methods, to effectively deanonymize users of a mix system. Furthermore the statistical disclosure attack is computationally efficient, and the conditions for it to be possible and accurate are much better understood. The new attack can be gener­ alized easily to a variety of anonymity systems beyond mix networks.

[1]  George Danezis,et al.  Mixminion: design of a type III anonymous remailer protocol , 2003, 2003 Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2003..

[2]  David Chaum,et al.  Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms , 1981, CACM.

[3]  Andreas Pfitzmann,et al.  The Disadvantages of Free MIX Routes and how to Overcome Them , 2000, Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability.

[4]  Dakshi Agrawal,et al.  Limits of Anonymity in Open Environments , 2002, Information Hiding.

[5]  Gene Tsudik,et al.  Mixing E-mail with Babel , 1996, Proceedings of Internet Society Symposium on Network and Distributed Systems Security.

[6]  George Danezis,et al.  Towards an Information Theoretic Metric for Anonymity , 2002, Privacy Enhancing Technologies.