Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms

Abstract In models without transfers, we show that every cardinal incentive compatible voting mechanism satisfying a continuity condition, can only take ordinal, but not cardinal information into account. Our results apply to many standard models in mechanism design without transfers, including the standard voting models with any domain restrictions.

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