Competition and Coordination in Two‐tier Public Service Systems Under Government Fiscal Policy

As a result of government budgetary limits and rapid market growth, many public service systems—such as healthcare—are characterized by extensive customer wait times that have become a serious problem. This problem might be solved by allowing private firms to enter these markets, which would provide customers with a choice between a free (governmental) public service provider and a fee-charging (or “toll”) private service provider. In such a two-tier service system, the two service providers are differentiated by service quality and cost efficiency. This paper focuses on the competition and coordination issues for two-tier service systems with customers who are sensitive to both service quality and delay. The free system attempts to maximize its expected total customer utility with limited capacity, whereas the toll system attempts to maximize its profit. Neither goal is aligned with the social welfare goal of the public service. To achieve the social welfare goal, the government plays a crucial role in coordinating the two-tier service system via the budget, the tradeoff of social members’ goals, and tax-subsidy policies. Using a mixed duopoly game, we establish Nash equilibrium strategies and identify the conditions for the existence of the two-tier service system. We employ several interesting and counter-intuitive managerial insights generated by the model to show that the public service can be delivered more efficiently via customer choice and service provider competition. In addition, we show that a relatively low tax-subsidy rate can almost perfectly coordinate the two service providers to achieve most of the maximum possible benefit of the two-tier service system.