Competitive equilibrium for almost all incomes: existence and fairness
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] M. Manea,et al. Asymptotic ordinal inefficiency of random serial dictatorship , 2009 .
[2] Jérôme Lang,et al. A General Elicitation-Free Protocol for Allocating Indivisible Goods , 2011, IJCAI.
[3] D. Fudenberg,et al. Self-confirming equilibrium , 1993 .
[4] Wojciech Słomczyński,et al. Pot and ladle: a formula for estimating the distribution of seats under the Jefferson–D’Hondt method , 2019, Public Choice.
[5] Xiaotie Deng,et al. On the complexity of price equilibria , 2003, J. Comput. Syst. Sci..
[6] Sophie Bade,et al. Random Serial Dictatorship: The One and Only , 2020, Math. Oper. Res..
[7] Steven J. Brams,et al. Mathematics and democracy: Designing better voting and fair-division procedures , 2008, Math. Comput. Model..
[8] Erel Segal-Halevi,et al. Fair Allocation based on Diminishing Differences , 2017, IJCAI.
[9] H. Scarf,et al. How to Compute Equilibrium Prices in 1891 , 2005 .
[10] Sylvain Bouveret,et al. Characterizing conflicts in fair division of indivisible goods using a scale of criteria , 2016, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems.
[11] Ramaswamy Chandrasekaran,et al. A Class of Sequential Games , 1971, Oper. Res..
[12] Siddharth Barman,et al. On the Proximity of Markets with Integral Equilibria , 2018, AAAI.
[13] Simina Brânzei,et al. To Give or Not to Give: Fair Division for Single Minded Valuations , 2016, IJCAI.
[14] Jörg Rothe,et al. Fairness and Rank-Weighted Utilitarianism in Resource Allocation , 2015, ADT.
[15] Mark Beech,et al. Proportional Representation , 1938 .
[16] Sarit Kraus,et al. Negotiation Strategies for Agents with Ordinal Preferences , 2018, IJCAI.
[17] Balázs Sziklai,et al. Bounds on Malapportionment , 2018, Oper. Res. Lett..
[18] Nejat Anbarci,et al. Noncooperative Foundations of the Area Monotonic Solution , 1993 .
[19] Christos H. Papadimitriou,et al. The Complexity of Fairness Through Equilibrium , 2013, ACM Trans. Economics and Comput..
[20] Antonio Nicolò,et al. Divide and compromise , 2017, Math. Soc. Sci..
[21] Simina Brânzei,et al. The Fisher Market Game: Equilibrium and Welfare , 2014, AAAI.
[22] L. Kóczy,et al. US vs. European Apportionment Practices: The Conflict between Monotonicity and Proportionality , 2017 .
[23] Eric Budish,et al. The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes , 2010, Journal of Political Economy.
[24] Moshe Babaioff,et al. Competitive Equilibria with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets , 2017, Math. Oper. Res..
[25] Steven J. Brams,et al. Dividing the Indivisible , 2002 .
[26] Bernard Grofman,et al. Divisor Methods for Sequential Portfolio Allocation in Multi-Party Executive Bodies: Evidence from Northern Ireland and Denmark , 2005 .
[27] Antonio Nicolò,et al. Equal opportunity equivalence in land division , 2012 .
[28] L. McKenzie,et al. On Equilibrium in Graham's Model of World Trade and Other Competitive Systems , 1954 .
[29] Hervé Moulin,et al. Competitive Division of a Mixed Manna , 2017, ArXiv.
[30] R. Aumann. Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality , 1995 .
[31] Erel Segal-Halevi,et al. Competitive Equilibrium For almost All Incomes , 2017, AAMAS.
[32] Nejat Anbarci,et al. Finite Alternating-Move Arbitration Schemes and the Equal Area Solution , 2006 .
[33] Hervé Moulin,et al. Fair division and collective welfare , 2003 .
[34] Ariel D. Procaccia,et al. The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare , 2016, EC.
[35] Hans Reijnierse,et al. On finding an envy-free Pareto-optimal division , 1998, Math. Program..
[36] Y. Narahari,et al. Groupwise Maximin Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods , 2017, AAAI.
[37] K. Arrow,et al. EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY , 1954 .
[38] Toby Walsh,et al. A Social Welfare Optimal Sequential Allocation Procedure , 2013, IJCAI.
[39] D. Weller,et al. Fair division of a measurable space , 1985 .
[40] Felix Brandt,et al. The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship , 2013, WINE.
[41] Toby Walsh,et al. Strategic Behavior when Allocating Indivisible Goods Sequentially , 2013, AAAI.
[42] Michel Balinski,et al. The Quota Method of Apportionment , 1975 .
[43] I. D. Hill. Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair‐division Procedures , 2008 .
[44] Erel Segal-Halevi,et al. Monotonicity and competitive equilibrium in cake-cutting , 2015 .
[45] H. Varian. Equity, Envy and Efficiency , 1974 .
[46] Moshe Babaioff,et al. Fair Allocation through Competitive Equilibrium from Generic Incomes , 2019, FAT.
[47] Haris Aziz,et al. Competitive equilibrium with equal incomes for allocation of indivisible objects , 2015, Oper. Res. Lett..
[48] Tamás Fleiner,et al. The Complexity of Cake Cutting with Unequal Shares , 2017, SAGT.
[49] B. Bernheim. Rationalizable Strategic Behavior , 1984 .
[50] Péter Biró,et al. Fair Apportionment in the View of the Venice Commission's Recommendation , 2013, Math. Soc. Sci..
[51] Moshe Babaioff,et al. Competitive Equilibrium with Generic Budgets: Beyond Additive , 2019, ArXiv.
[52] Erel Segal-Halevi,et al. Cake-Cutting with Different Entitlements: How Many Cuts are Needed? , 2018, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications.
[53] Simina Brânzei,et al. Characterization and Computation of Equilibria for Indivisible Goods , 2015, SAGT.
[54] Redaktionen. Leon Walras: Elements of Pure Economics, or the Theory of Social Wealth. Translated by William Jaffé. George Allen and Unwin, London 1954. 620 sider. Pris: 42 sh. , 1954 .
[55] John. Moore,et al. Subgame Perfect Implementation , 1988 .
[56] Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi,et al. Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods to Asymmetric Agents , 2017, AAMAS.
[57] Atila Abdulkadiroglu,et al. RANDOM SERIAL DICTATORSHIP AND THE CORE FROM RANDOM ENDOWMENTS IN HOUSE ALLOCATION PROBLEMS , 1998 .
[58] Yan Yu,et al. Strategic divide and choose , 2008, Games Econ. Behav..
[59] Warut Suksompong,et al. Democratic Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods , 2017, IJCAI.
[60] H. P. Young,et al. An axiomatization of Borda's rule , 1974 .
[61] Bo Li,et al. Maxmin Share Fair Allocation of Indivisible Chores to Asymmetric Agents , 2019, AAMAS.
[62] Toby Walsh,et al. Equilibria in Sequential Allocation , 2017, ADT.
[63] Jugal Garg,et al. Approximating Nash Social Welfare under Submodular Valuations through (Un)Matchings , 2019, SODA.