Bodily awareness and the self

What can we learn about the nature of the self from reflection on bodily experience? I shall come at this question by addressing a more specific issue: how much ice does the phenomenon of bodily awareness cut against a Cartesian conception of the self? In other words, what, if anything, can be extracted from the nature of a person's epistemological relation with his body, in defence of the common sense, anti-Cartesian, idea of a person as no less basically bodily than mentally endowed?

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