论文信息 - A note on network formation with decay

A note on network formation with decay

Abstract This paper studies an endogenous network formation with decay. We introduce a strategic form game based on a simple bilateral cost allocation rule. We show that a strong Nash equilibrium of this game always exists and necessarily achieves efficient networks.

Shigetaka Yamakawa | Nobuo Matsubayashi

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