Optimal Auctions are Hard

We study a fundamental problem in micro economics called optimal auction design: A seller wishes to sell an item to a group of self-interested agents. Each agenti has aprivately known valuationvi for the object. Given a distribution on these valuations, the goal is to construct an optimal auction, i.e. a truth revealing protocol that maximizes the seller’s expected

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