How bad is selfish routing?

We consider the problem of routing traffic to optimize the performance of a congested network. We are given a network, a rate of traffic between each pair of nodes, and a latency function for each edge specifying the time needed to traverse the edge given its congestion; the objective is to route traffic such that the sum of all travel times---the total latency---is minimized.In many settings, it may be expensive or impossible to regulate network traffic so as to implement an optimal assignment of routes. In the absence of regulation by some central authority, we assume that each network user routes its traffic on the minimum-latency path available to it, given the network congestion caused by the other users. In general such a "selfishly motivated" assignment of traffic to paths will not minimize the total latency; hence, this lack of regulation carries the cost of decreased network performance.In this article, we quantify the degradation in network performance due to unregulated traffic. We prove that if the latency of each edge is a linear function of its congestion, then the total latency of the routes chosen by selfish network users is at most 4/3 times the minimum possible total latency (subject to the condition that all traffic must be routed). We also consider the more general setting in which edge latency functions are assumed only to be continuous and nondecreasing in the edge congestion. Here, the total latency of the routes chosen by unregulated selfish network users may be arbitrarily larger than the minimum possible total latency; however, we prove that it is no more than the total latency incurred by optimally routing twice as much traffic.

[1]  F. Knight Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost , 1924 .

[2]  R. Cohn The resistance of an electrical network , 1950 .

[3]  J. G. Wardrop,et al.  Some Theoretical Aspects of Road Traffic Research , 1952 .

[4]  J. Wardrop ROAD PAPER. SOME THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF ROAD TRAFFIC RESEARCH. , 1952 .

[5]  R. Duffin,et al.  On the algebra of networks , 1953 .

[6]  T. Koopmans,et al.  Studies in the Economics of Transportation. , 1956 .

[7]  C. B. Mcguire,et al.  Studies in the Economics of Transportation , 1958 .

[8]  J. Goodman Note on Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games , 1965 .

[9]  Dietrich Braess,et al.  Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung , 1968, Unternehmensforschung.

[10]  Stella C. Dafermos,et al.  Traffic assignment problem for a general network , 1969 .

[11]  A. Mowbray Road to ruin , 1969 .

[12]  Walter Knödel,et al.  Graphentheoretische Methoden und ihre Anwendungen , 1969 .

[13]  J. D. Murchland,et al.  Braess's paradox of traffic flow , 1970 .

[14]  R. Rosenthal A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria , 1973 .

[15]  M. J. Smith,et al.  In a road network, increasing delay locally can reduce delay globally , 1978 .

[16]  M. A. Hall,et al.  Properties of the Equilibrium State in Transportation Networks , 1978 .

[17]  C. Fisk More paradoxes in the equilibrium assignment problem , 1979 .

[18]  Mike Smith,et al.  The existence, uniqueness and stability of traffic equilibria , 1979 .

[19]  Stella Dafermos,et al.  Traffic Equilibrium and Variational Inequalities , 1980 .

[20]  T. Magnanti,et al.  Equilibria on a Congested Transportation Network , 1981 .

[21]  Marguerite FRANK,et al.  The Braess paradox , 1981, Math. Program..

[22]  Richard Steinberg,et al.  PREVALENCE OF BRAESS' PARADOX , 1983 .

[23]  A. Nagurney,et al.  ON SOME TRAFFIC EQUILIBRIUM THEORY PARADOXES , 1984 .

[24]  Alain Haurie,et al.  On the relationship between Nash - Cournot and Wardrop equilibria , 1983, Networks.

[25]  Y. She Urban Transportation Networks: Equilibrium Analysis with Mathematical Programming Methods , 1985 .

[26]  Yosef Sheffi,et al.  Urban Transportation Networks: Equilibrium Analysis With Mathematical Programming Methods , 1985 .

[27]  Michael Florian,et al.  Nonlinear cost network models in transportation analysis , 1986 .

[28]  Pradeep Dubey,et al.  Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria , 1986, Math. Oper. Res..

[29]  Dimitri P. Bertsekas,et al.  Data Networks , 1986 .

[30]  Richard Steinberg,et al.  The Prevalence of Paradoxes in Transportation Equilibrium Problems , 1988, Transp. Sci..

[31]  A. Peressini,et al.  The Mathematics Of Nonlinear Programming , 1988 .

[32]  Joel E. Cohen,et al.  A paradox of congestion in a queuing network , 1990, Journal of Applied Probability.

[33]  Joel E. Cohen,et al.  Paradoxical behaviour of mechanical and electrical networks , 1991, Nature.

[34]  Dimitri P. Bertsekas,et al.  Data networks (2nd ed.) , 1992 .

[35]  P. Gács,et al.  Algorithms , 1992 .

[36]  Ariel Orda,et al.  Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks , 1993, TNET.

[37]  Ariel Orda,et al.  Competitive routing in multi-user communication networks , 1993, IEEE INFOCOM '93 The Conference on Computer Communications, Proceedings.

[38]  S. Meyn,et al.  THE EXISTENCE OF AN “I” , 2020, The Nature of Order, Book 4: The Luminous Ground.

[39]  J. Warner The road to ruin. , 1996, Nursing standard (Royal College of Nursing (Great Britain) : 1987).

[40]  Ariel Orda,et al.  Avoiding the Braess paradox in non-cooperative networks , 1999, Journal of Applied Probability.

[41]  Ariel Orda,et al.  Virtual path bandwidth allocation in multiuser networks , 1997, TNET.

[42]  Cynthia A. Phillips,et al.  Optimal Time-Critical Scheduling via Resource Augmentation , 1997, STOC '97.

[43]  Ariel Orda,et al.  Capacity allocation under noncooperative routing , 1997, IEEE Trans. Autom. Control..

[44]  Deborah Estrin,et al.  Recommendations on Queue Management and Congestion Avoidance in the Internet , 1998, RFC.

[45]  Yurii Nesterov,et al.  Stable flows in transportation networks , 1999 .

[46]  Christos H. Papadimitriou,et al.  Worst-case Equilibria , 1999, STACS.

[47]  Christos H. Papadimitriou,et al.  Worst-case equilibria , 1999 .

[48]  Tim Roughgarden,et al.  How bad is selfish routing? , 2000, Proceedings 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.

[49]  A. Nagurney Sustainable Transportation Networks , 2000 .

[50]  A. Palma,et al.  Stable Dynamics in Transportation Systems , 2000 .

[51]  Bala Kalyanasundaram,et al.  Speed is as powerful as clairvoyance , 2000, JACM.

[52]  Christos H. Papadimitriou,et al.  Algorithms, games, and the internet , 2001, STOC '01.

[53]  Christos H. Papadimitriou,et al.  Algorithms, Games, and the Internet , 2001, ICALP.

[54]  J. N. Hagstrom,et al.  Characterizing Braess's paradox for traffic networks , 2001, ITSC 2001. 2001 IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems. Proceedings (Cat. No.01TH8585).

[55]  Paul G. Spirakis,et al.  The price of selfish routing , 2001, STOC '01.

[56]  Tim Roughgarden,et al.  Stackelberg scheduling strategies , 2001, STOC '01.

[57]  Tim Roughgarden,et al.  Designing networks for selfish users is hard , 2001, Proceedings 2001 IEEE International Conference on Cluster Computing.

[58]  Tim Roughgarden,et al.  The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology , 2002, STOC '02.

[59]  Berthold Vöcking,et al.  Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria , 2002, SODA '02.

[60]  Eric J. Friedman,et al.  A Generic Analysis of Selfish Routing , 2002 .

[61]  Tim Roughgarden,et al.  Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games , 2004, Games Econ. Behav..