Duo-Onions and Hydra-Onions - Failure and Adversary Resistant Onion Protocols

A serious weakness of the onion protocol, one of the major tools for anonymous communication, is its vulnerability to network failures and/or an adversary trying to break the communication. This is facilitated by the fact that each message is sent through a path of a certain length and a failure in a single point of this path prohibits message delivery. Since the path cannot be too short in order to offer anonymity protection (at least logarithmic in the number of nodes), the failure probability might be quite substantial.

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