Misreporting behaviour in iterated prisoner's dilemma game with combined trust strategy

Effects of agents’ misreporting behaviour on system cooperation are studied in a multi-agent iterated prisoner's dilemma game. Agents, adopting combined trust strategy (denoted by CTS) are classified into three groups, i.e., honest CTS, positive-reporting CTS and negative-reporting CTS. The differences of cooperation frequency and pay-off under three different systems, i.e., system only with honest CTS, system with honest CTS and positive-reporting CTS and system with honest CTS and negative-reporting CTS, are compared. Furthermore, we also investigate the effects of misreporting behaviour on an exploiter who adopts an exploiting strategy (denoted by EXPL) in a system with two CTSs and one EXPL. At last, numerical simulations are performed for understanding the effects of misreporting behaviour on CTS. The results reveal that positive-reporting behaviour can strengthen system cooperation, while negative-reporting behaviour cannot. When EXPL exists in a system, positive-reporting behaviour helps the exploiter in reducing its exploiting cost and encourages agents to adopt exploiting strategy, but hurts other agents’ interests.

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