论文信息 - A Communication-Proof Equilibrium Concept

A Communication-Proof Equilibrium Concept

Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28903 Getafe, SpainReceived February 4, 1992; revised October 24, 1994This paper proposes an equilibrium concept for the classes of environments inwhich players can communicate with each other but cannot make bindingagreements. The communication-proof equilibrium is intended to be regarded as anextension of both coalition- and renegotiation-proof equilibria. Conceptual founda-tions for this particular definition are discussed as it is confronted with otherdefinitions in these environments. Journal of Economic Literature ClassificationNumber: C72.

José Luis Ferreira | J. L. Ferreira

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