Abstract : In the January 2003 issue of the United States Naval Institute's Proceedings, Dr. Milan Vego, Professor of Operations at the Naval War College, warns, "Network Centric Warfare (NCW) increasingly is becoming a new orthodoxy - a set of beliefs that cannot seriously be challenged."1 He and many other critics contend that NCW theorists fail to consider "Clause-witzian thoughts on the nature of war, the relationship between policy and use of military power, and the effect of fog of war and friction."2 They lament the perceived emphasis on tactics and targeting to the apparent exclusion of operational art, and warn that command and control (C2) is becoming increasingly centralized.3 What they don't say is that NCW is a bad idea, that it is unachievable, or that there is an alternate path for the transformation of the Defense Department advocated by the current administration. One look at the Secretary of Defense's transformation plan (including his choice for heading the Office of Transformation), at recent defense authorization figures, or at any of the emerging joint and Service operational concepts will confirm that NCW plays a prominent (if not dominant) role in the reshaping of the military.
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