An Optimal Test for Strategic Interaction in Social and Economic Network Formation between Heterogeneous Agents

We introduce a test for whether agents' preferences over network structure are interdependent. Interdependent preferences induce strategic behavior since the optimal set of links directed by agent i will vary with the configuration of links directed by other agents. Our model also incorporates agent-specific in- and out-degree heterogeneity and homophily on observable agent attributes. This introduces 2N+K^2 nuisance parameters (N is number of agents in the network and K the number of possible agent attribute configurations). Under the null equilibrium is unique, but our hypothesis is nevertheless a composite one as the degree heterogeneity and homophily nuisance parameters may range freely across their parameter space. Under the alternative our model is incomplete; there may be multiple equilibrium network configurations and our test is agnostic about which one is selected. Motivated by size control, and exploiting the exponential family structure of our model under the null, we restrict ourselves to conditional tests. We characterize the exact null distribution of a family of conditional tests and introduce a novel Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm for simulating this distribution. We also characterize the locally best test. The form of this test depends upon the gradient of the likelihood with respect to the strategic interaction parameter in the neighborhood of the null. Remarkably, this gradient, and consequently the form of the locally best test statistic, does not depend on how an equilibrium is selected. Exploiting this lack of dependence, we outline a feasible version of the locally best test. We present two illustrative applications. First, we test for whether nations behave strategically when choosing locations for overseas diplomatic missions. Second, we test for whether firms prefer to sell to firms with richer customer bases (i.e., whether firms value “indirect customers”). Some Monte Carlo experiments explore the size and power properties of our test in practice.

[1]  Yves Zenou,et al.  Peer Effects and Social Networks in Education , 2008 .

[2]  A. Tarski A LATTICE-THEORETICAL FIXPOINT THEOREM AND ITS APPLICATIONS , 1955 .

[3]  Allan Sly,et al.  Random graphs with a given degree sequence , 2010, 1005.1136.

[4]  Sanjeev Goyal,et al.  A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation , 2000 .

[5]  Camille Roth,et al.  Connections: An Introduction to the Economics of Networks by Sanjeev Goyal , 2010, J. Artif. Soc. Soc. Simul..

[6]  B. Graham An Econometric Model of Network Formation With Degree Heterogeneity , 2017 .

[7]  Matthias Müller-Hannemann,et al.  Uniform sampling of undirected and directed graphs with a fixed degree sequence , 2009, ArXiv.

[8]  A. Rao,et al.  A Markov chain Monte carol method for generating random (0, 1)-matrices with given marginals , 1996 .

[9]  Harrison H. Zhou,et al.  Rate-optimal graphon estimation , 2014, 1410.5837.

[10]  M. McPherson,et al.  BIRDS OF A FEATHER: Homophily , 2001 .

[11]  N. Christakis,et al.  Social Networks and Cooperation in Hunter-Gatherers , 2011, Nature.

[12]  J. Nash Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games. , 1950, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

[13]  James Roberts,et al.  Network structure of production , 2011, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

[14]  Yi Zhang,et al.  Robust likelihood ratio tests for incomplete economic models , 2019, 1910.04610.

[15]  M. McPherson,et al.  Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks , 2001 .

[16]  Albert-Lszl Barabsi,et al.  Network Science , 2016, Encyclopedia of Big Data.

[17]  Yves Zenou,et al.  R&D Networks: Theory, Empirics, and Policy Implications , 2014, Review of Economics and Statistics.

[18]  Daniele Ballinari,et al.  Uniform Sampling of Graphs with Fixed Degree Sequence under Partition Constraints , 2019 .

[19]  Xiangyu Chang,et al.  Asymptotic Normality of Maximum Likelihood and its Variational Approximation for Stochastic Blockmodels , 2012, ArXiv.

[20]  Zoltan Toroczkai,et al.  An algebraic Monte-Carlo algorithm for the partition adjacency matrix realization problem , 2017, Algebraic Statistics.

[21]  N. Wikler,et al.  The Economic Consequences , 1985 .

[22]  Eric D. Kolaczyk,et al.  Statistical Analysis of Network Data , 2009 .

[23]  Yuhei Miyauchi Structural Estimation of Pairwise Stable Networks with Nonnegative Externality , 2016 .

[24]  Elie Tamer,et al.  Identifying preferences in networks with bounded degree , 2016 .

[25]  Mark Newman,et al.  Networks: An Introduction , 2010 .

[26]  M. Jackson,et al.  The stability and efficiency of directed communication networks , 2000 .

[27]  Andreas Dzemski,et al.  An Empirical Model of Dyadic Link Formation in a Network with Unobserved Heterogeneity , 2018, Review of Economics and Statistics.

[28]  Kevin E. Bassler,et al.  Constructing and sampling directed graphs with given degree sequences , 2011, ArXiv.

[29]  Stephen E. Fienberg,et al.  Statistical Inference in a Directed Network Model With Covariates , 2016, Journal of the American Statistical Association.

[30]  Leo van Iersel,et al.  Graph Realizations Constrained by Skeleton Graphs , 2017, Electron. J. Comb..

[31]  Trevor Tao,et al.  An improved MCMC algorithm for generating random graphs from constrained distributions , 2016, Network Science.

[32]  M. Jackson,et al.  A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks , 1996 .

[33]  Brandon J Kinne,et al.  Dependent diplomacy: : signaling, strategy, and prestige in the diplomatic network , 2014 .

[34]  Matthew O. Jackson,et al.  The Formation of Networks with Transfers Among Players , 2004, J. Econ. Theory.

[35]  Kevin E. Bassler,et al.  Efficient and Exact Sampling of Simple Graphs with Given Arbitrary Degree Sequence , 2010, PloS one.

[36]  Mark S. Granovetter The Strength of Weak Ties , 1973, American Journal of Sociology.

[37]  J. Tinbergen Shaping the World Economy: Suggestions for an International Economic Policy , 1964 .

[38]  Gerald S. Rogers,et al.  Mathematical Statistics: A Decision Theoretic Approach , 1967 .

[39]  Bryan S. Graham,et al.  Testing for externalities in network formation using simulation , 2019, The Econometric Analysis of Network Data.

[40]  Persi Diaconis,et al.  A Sequential Importance Sampling Algorithm for Generating Random Graphs with Prescribed Degrees , 2011, Internet Math..

[41]  Heinz Bauer,et al.  Maß- und Integrationstheorie , 1992 .

[42]  Koen Jochmans,et al.  Semiparametric Analysis of Network Formation , 2018 .

[43]  David R. Cox,et al.  PRINCIPLES OF STATISTICAL INFERENCE , 2017 .

[44]  Alistair Sinclair,et al.  Algorithms for Random Generation and Counting: A Markov Chain Approach , 1993, Progress in Theoretical Computer Science.

[45]  J. Stock,et al.  Weak Instruments in Instrumental Variables Regression: Theory and Practice , 2019, Annual Review of Economics.

[46]  Jonathan J. Forster,et al.  Markov chain Monte Carlo exact inference for social networks , 2007, Soc. Networks.

[47]  Konrad Menzel,et al.  STRATEGIC NETWORK FORMATION WITH MANY AGENTS , 2016 .

[48]  Karyne B. Charbonneau,et al.  Multiple Fixed Effects in Binary Response Panel Data Models , 2017 .

[49]  Elie Tamer,et al.  Monte Carlo Confidence Sets for Identified Sets , 2016, 1605.00499.

[50]  Aravind Srinivasan,et al.  Probability and Computing , 2018, SIGA.

[51]  Ulrik Brandes,et al.  What is network science? , 2013, Network Science.

[52]  Marcelo J. Moreira Tests with correct size when instruments can be arbitrarily weak , 2009 .

[53]  Aureo de Paula,et al.  Econometric Analysis of Games with Multiple Equilibria , 2012 .

[54]  Shuyang Sheng,et al.  A Structural Econometric Analysis of Network Formation Games Through Subnetworks , 2020 .

[55]  Edoardo M. Airoldi,et al.  Mixed Membership Stochastic Blockmodels , 2007, NIPS.

[56]  Michael Boss,et al.  Network topology of the interbank market , 2003, cond-mat/0309582.