NUMBER 4 A target hides himself in one of the boxes 1,2, ... , m with probability distribution X=<Xl, ... , Xm) and can move to any of other boxes after each unsuccessful search by a searcher. The searcher is not informed of x and continues search until the target is found. He is informed of Ci'S, i.e., examination costs of each box, and ai's, i= 1, ... , m, where ai is the probability of overlooking the target if i is searched and the target is in i. A formulation of this two-sided search game in which "non-blind" target and "noisy" searcher are involved is given in a stochastic game framework, and the game is solved in some special cases.
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