Does Social Capital Reduce Crime?

We investigate the effects of civic norms and associational networks on crime rates. Civic norms may attach guilt and shame to criminal behavior, thus increasing its opportunity cost. Associational networks may increase returns to noncriminal activities and raise detection probabilities, but they may also work as communication channels for criminals and may offer official cover to criminal activities. The empirical assessment of these effects poses serious problems of endogeneity, omitted variables, measurement error, and spatial correlation. Italy’s great variance in social and economic characteristics, its homogeneity in policies and institutions, and the availability of historical data on social capital in its regions allow us to minimize the first two problems. To tackle the last two problems, we use report‐rate‐adjusted crime rates and estimate a spatial lag model. We find that both civic norms and associational networks have a negative and significant effect on property crimes across Italian provinces.

[1]  I. Kawachi,et al.  Social capital, income inequality, and firearm violent crime. , 1998, Social science & medicine.

[2]  Crime and Conformism , 2005 .

[3]  E. Glaeser,et al.  Crime and Social Interactions , 1995 .

[4]  J. Coleman,et al.  Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital , 1988, American Journal of Sociology.

[5]  C. Bjørnskov The multiple facets of social capital , 2006 .

[6]  R. Putnam Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital , 1995, The City Reader.

[7]  Gerardo A. Guerra,et al.  Trust Responsiveness and Beliefs , 2002 .

[8]  Jörgen W. Weibull,et al.  Crime, punishment and social norms , 2005 .

[9]  Dc Washington National Institute of Justice. , 2010 .

[10]  Organized Crime, Corruption and Punishment , 2003 .

[11]  B. Frey,et al.  Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical Evidence , 2000 .

[12]  Daniel Lederman,et al.  Violent Crime: Does Social Capital Matter?* , 2002, Economic Development and Cultural Change.

[13]  M. Hollis Trust Within Reason , 1998 .

[14]  Bruce Sacerdote,et al.  Why is There More Crime in Cities? , 1996, Journal of Political Economy.

[15]  P. Buonanno,et al.  Crime and Labour Market Opportunities in Italy (1993-2002) , 2006 .

[16]  Jeffrey T. Grogger,et al.  Market Wages and Youth Crime , 1997, Journal of Labor Economics.

[17]  R. Matsueda,et al.  THE DYNAMICS OF DELINQUENT PEERS AND DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR , 1998 .

[18]  B. Frey Not Just for the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation , 1998 .

[19]  R. Putnam,et al.  Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. , 1994 .

[20]  E. Glaeser,et al.  Why is There More Crime in Cities? , 1996, Journal of Political Economy.

[21]  Lawrence F. Katz,et al.  The Company You Keep: The Effects of Family and Neighborhood on Disadvantaged Youths , 1991 .

[22]  Antonio Merlo,et al.  What Accounts for the Decline in Crime? , 2001 .

[23]  Martin Dufwenberg,et al.  A theory of sequential reciprocity , 2004, Games Econ. Behav..

[24]  Lawrence F. Katz,et al.  Neighborhood Effects on Crime for Female and Male Youth: Evidence from a Randomized Housing Voucher Experiment , 2004 .

[25]  J. Ludwig,et al.  Urban Poverty and Juvenile Crime: Evidence from a Randomized Housing-Mobility Experiment , 2001 .

[26]  Yves Zenou,et al.  Peer Effects and Social Networks in Education and Crime , 2005 .

[27]  James C. Cox,et al.  How to identify trust and reciprocity , 2004, Games Econ. Behav..

[28]  Steven D. Levitt,et al.  An Economic Analysis of a Drug-Selling Gang&Apos;S Finances , 1998 .

[29]  Robert D. Putnam,et al.  Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community , 2000, CSCW '00.

[30]  Paul S. Heaton Does Religion Really Reduce Crime?* , 2006, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[31]  D. Haynie Delinquent Peers Revisited: Does Network Structure Matter?1 , 2001, American Journal of Sociology.

[32]  Matthew Rabin,et al.  Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory , 1991 .

[33]  Stephen J. Rassenti,et al.  Reciprocity, Trust, and Payoff Privacy in Extensive Form Bargaining , 1998 .

[34]  Yves Zenou,et al.  Working Paper No . 601 , 2003 Social Networks and Crime Decisions : The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behavior , 2003 .

[35]  Lones Smith,et al.  National Poverty Center Working Paper Series Street Crime and Street Culture Street Crime and Street Culture * , 2022 .

[36]  Ricardo Lagos,et al.  Crime, Inequality, and Unemployment , 2002 .

[37]  Stephen F. Knack,et al.  Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation , 1997 .

[38]  Kevin M. Murphy,et al.  Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth? , 1993 .

[39]  G. Peri Socio-Cultural Variables and Economic Success: Evidence from Italian Provinces 1951-1991 , 2004 .

[40]  Martin Dufwenberg,et al.  Marital investments, time consistency and emotions , 2002 .

[41]  E. Ostrom,et al.  Trust and reciprocity : interdisciplinary lessons from experimental research , 2003 .

[42]  Yves Zenou,et al.  Centre De Referència En Economia Analítica Barcelona Economics Working Paper Series Working Paper Nº 180 Strong and Weak Ties in Employment and Crime Strong and Weak Ties in Employment and Crime * Barcelona Economics Wp Nº 180 , 2022 .

[43]  I. Ehrlich Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation , 1973, Journal of Political Economy.

[44]  Armin Falk,et al.  A Theory of Reciprocity , 2001, Games Econ. Behav..

[45]  J. Koskinen,et al.  Mobilizing for Y2K: A status report , 1999, IT Professional.

[46]  M. Rubio Perverse Social Capital—Some Evidence from Colombia , 1997 .

[47]  R. Putnam,et al.  Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. , 1994 .

[48]  L. Anselin Spatial Econometrics: Methods and Models , 1988 .

[49]  Bruce A. Weinberg,et al.  Crime Rates and Local Labor Market Opportunities In the United States: 1979-1997 , 2000 .

[50]  Banfield,et al.  MORAL BASIS OF A BACKWARD SOCIETY , 1958 .

[51]  Joyce E. Berg,et al.  Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History , 1995 .

[52]  R. Putnam Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital , 1995 .

[53]  R. Sah Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime , 1991, Journal of Political Economy.

[54]  F. Bourguignon,et al.  A Structural Model of Crime and Inequality in Colombia , 2003 .

[55]  Richard B. Freeman Crime and the Employment of Disadvantaged Youths , 1991 .

[56]  E. Baumer,et al.  Dimensions of Social Capital and Rates of Criminal Homicide , 2004 .

[57]  E. Rasmusen Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality , 1996, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[58]  Crime, Inequality, and Unemployment, Second Version , 2003 .

[59]  Martin Paldam,et al.  An essay on social capital: looking for the fire behind the smoke , 2000 .

[60]  A. Liska,et al.  Functions of Crime: A Paradoxical Process , 1991, American Journal of Sociology.

[61]  Steven Raphael,et al.  Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on Crime* , 2001, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[62]  Lesley Schulte,et al.  Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community , 2009 .

[63]  P. H. Huang,et al.  EMOTIONAL RESPONSES IN LITIGATION , 1992 .

[64]  On the Validity of the Random Lottery Incentive System , 1998 .

[65]  Pablo Fajnzylber,et al.  Inequality and Violent Crime* , 2002, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[66]  E. Baumer,et al.  Social Capital and Homicide , 2001 .

[67]  Paola Sapienza,et al.  The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development , 2004 .

[68]  Yves Zenou The Spatial Aspects of Crime , 2003 .

[69]  Paola Sapienza,et al.  Long Term Persistence , 2008 .

[70]  R. Rosenthal Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox , 1981 .

[71]  Colin Camerer Behavioral Game Theory , 1990 .

[72]  Mitchell B. Chamlin,et al.  SOCIAL ALTRUISM AND CRIME , 1997 .