Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games

We propose a new cost allocation rule for minimum cost Spanning tree games. The new rule is a core selection and also satisfices cost monotonicity. We also give charqcterization theorems for the new rule as well as the much-studied Bird allocation. We show that the principal difference between these two rules is interms of their consistency properties.

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