The location service provided by the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) has gained great impact on our life. However, the signal blockage, jamming and spoofing attack lead to a serious impediment to its further application. The receivers are able to be aware of the signal blockage and jamming through signal processing technology. The goal of the signal blockage and jamming is to prevent the receiver from receiving the broadcast signals and make the receivers fail to provide navigation information. Unlike the signal blockage and jamming, the spoofing attack feeds the receivers false signals and make the receivers to output erroneous navigation information. Thus the spoofing attack detection is more difficult. Under the circumstance that no spoofing attack existing, each antenna receives unique signals. Consequently, the baseline between each pair of receivers can be calculated. Assuming the baseline length is subject to Gaussian distribution, then mean value is fixed with some noise between the pairs of receivers. When the spoofing attack occurs, the antennas receive the identical spoofing signals, which result the position solutions are almost the same. Under this condition, baseline length mean value becomes to be zero. The separation is employed as an indicator to detect the spoofing attack occurrence in the hypothesis test. In this paper, we analyzed the detectors based the baseline data. Three cases are investigated with different setups: (1) single fixed baseline; (2) two fixed and independent baselines; (3) Max/Min model for two independent baselines. In addition, the influence of the baseline length on the detection performance is analyzed, and the performance of three studied cases are evaluated by comparing the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves. The results demonstrate effectiveness of the model.
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