Determinants of Resolving a Conflict of Interest

Three variables hypothesized as constraints on the resolution of a conflict of interest were found to significantly influence attempts to resolve the conflict and to bias perceptions of the situation. Using a model of the political decision-making process, the three variables were arranged in a 2 x 2 x 2 design with 6 male and 6 female dyads in each cell. Conflict of interest, in which the resources could be distributed only to one party's positions, resulted in less money allocated and in perceptions of the situation as more of a win-lose competition, of compromise as more like defeat, and of the greater importance of coming out favorably, than did conflict in which the resources could be distributed between the competing positions. Formal assignment of conflict positions resulted in less money allocated, and longer negotiations, than self-design of conflict positions. An explicit link between competing conflict positions and an ideological dissensus impeded conflict resolution for males, but not for females. The latter two inhibiting influences on conflict resolution were considered aspects of representation.

[1]  D. Druckman,et al.  Conflict of Interest and Value Dissensus: Propositions in the Sociology of Conflict , 1973 .

[2]  J L Bresnahan,et al.  A general equation and technique for the exact partitioning of chi-square contingency tables. , 1966, Psychological bulletin.

[3]  D. Druckman.  On the effects of group representation. , 1971 .

[4]  R. Stagner.  Psychological aspects of international conflict , 1967 .

[5]  T. Schelling.  The Strategy of Conflict , 1963 .

[6]  Allen L. Edwards,et al.  Experimental Design in Psychological Research. , 1951 .

[7]  M. Hermann,et al.  Negotiation in leader and delegate groups , 1968 .

[8]  M. Deutsch,et al.  Socially relevant science: reflections on some studies of interpersonal conflict. , 1969, The American psychologist.

[9]  D. Druckman.  Prenegotiation experience and dyadic conflic resolution in a bargaining situation , 1968 .

[10]  D. Druckman,et al.  Dogmatism, prenegotiation experience, and simulated group representation as determinants of dyadic behavior in a bargaining situation. , 1967, Journal of personality and social psychology.

[11]  B. J. Winer.  Statistical Principles in Experimental Design , 1992 .

[12]  D. Druckman.  Double agreement with reversed items: the plausibility of an alternative explanation to response bias. , 1970, The Journal of general psychology.

[13]  R. R. Blake,et al.  Competition, Communication, and Conformity. , 1961 .

[14]  N. Vidmar.  Effects of Representational Roles and Mediators on Negotiation Effectiveness. , 1971 .

[15]  B. Bass.  Effects on the subsequent performance of negotiators of studying issues or planning strategies alone or in groups. , 1966, Psychological monographs.

[16]  J. McGrath,et al.  Forces Affecting Success in Negotiation Groups. , 1970 .

[17]  M. Freedman,et al.  The Functions of Social Conflict , 1959 .

[18]  D. A. Summers,et al.  Training, Tasks and Mediator Orientation in Heterocultural Negotiations , 1968 .

[19]  W. Evan,et al.  Interorganizational conflict: a labor-management bargaining experiment , 1967 .

[20]  G. Dunteman,et al.  Biases in the evaluation of one's own group, its allies and opponents , 1963 .

[21]  Vilhelm Aubert,et al.  Competition and dissensus: two types of conflict and of conflict resolution , 1963 .

[22]  T. Scheff.  A theory of social coordination applicable to mixed-motive games. , 1967, Sociometry.

[23]  Helmut Lamm,et al.  Risk taking in the context of intergroup negotiation , 1970 .

[24]  S. Siegel,et al.  Bargaining And Group Decision Making , 1960 .

[25]  J. Thibaut,et al.  The development of contractual norms in a bargaining situation under two types of stress , 1965 .

[26]  D. Druckman,et al.  Conflict of Interest and Value Dissensus , 1970 .