Analysis of Cyber-attacks Influence on the Identification of Critical Measurements

With the deep integration of power and ICT(information and communication technology) systems, the potential security problems of new generation power system are not only confined to physical power system, but also become physical security problems of power networks. The SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) system is easy to be attacked for its defects and leaks. Since it is closely linked to the observability of the power system state, whether the identification of critical measurements and critical measurement sets is robust under cyber-attacks should be focused on. Based on the properties of the critical measurement and the critical measurement set, the potential influences of various cyberattacks on them are analyzed. Whether the identification results of the critical measurement and the critical measurement group are impacted depends on the attacked measurements' type and location, as well as the attacker’s intention. Moreover, the IEEE-14 power system is applied as an example to verify the effectiveness of the analysis in the paper.

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