Dynamic Group Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange under Standard Assumptions

Authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange allows two principals communicating over a public network, and each holding public/ private keys, to agree on a shared secret value. In this paper we study the natural extension of this cryptographic problem to a group of principals. We begin from existing formal security models and refine them to incorporate major missing details (e.g., strong-corruption and concurrent sessions). With in this model we define the execution of a protocol for authenticated dynamic group Diffie-Hellman and show that it is provably secure under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our security result holds in the standard model and thus provides better security guarantees than previously published results in the random oracle model.

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