Outlines of a Formal Theory of Value, I

Physics has advanced, however, without answering metaphysical questions; statistics has advanced without answering semantical questions; and it is our opinion that similar substantial progress in the theory of value can be made independent of metaphysics and semantics. As in other disciplines, theory in the domain of value can proceed along formal lines without waiting upon a solution to the grand questions; indeed even the most modest constructive progress might result, here as elsewhere, in putting what have been considered the fundamental problems in a new light. We take it as the general function of formal value theory to provide formal criteria for rational decision, choice and evaluation. Our conception of this aspect of value theory is in one way similar to Kant's, for like him we believe it possible to state in purely formal terms certain necessary conditions for rationality with respect to value. Unlike Kant, however, we do not suggest that any particular evaluations or value principles can be derived from purely formal considerations. Value theory, as here conceived, is associated with another venerable, and at present rather unfashionable, tradition, for it seems to us that there is a sense in which it is perfectly correct to say that just as logic can be used to define neces1 The unexpected death of Professor J. C. C. McKinsey after the completion of an earlier and much shorter draft of the present paper means that although he played a major part in formulating the fundamental ideas he cannot be held accountable for any of the shortcomings of the final version.