Model Checking Coalition Nash Equilibria in MAD Distributed Systems

We present two OBDD based model checking algorithms for the verification of Nash equilibria in finite state mechanisms modeling Multiple Administrative Domains (MAD) distributed systems with possibly colluding agents (coalitions ) and with possibly faulty or malicious nodes (Byzantine agents). Given a finite state mechanism, a proposed protocol for each agent and the maximum sizes f for Byzantine agents and q for agents collusions, our model checkers return Pass if the proposed protocol is an *** -f -q -Nash equilibrium, i.e. no coalition of size up to q may have an interest greater than *** in deviating from the proposed protocol when up to f Byzantine agents are present, Fail otherwise. We implemented our model checking algorithms within the NuSMV model checker: the first one explicitly checks equilibria for each coalition, while the second represents symbolically all coalitions. We present experimental results showing their effectiveness for moderate size mechanisms. For example, we can verify coalition Nash equilibria for mechanisms which corresponding normal form games would have more than 5 ×1021 entries. Moreover, we compare the two approaches, and the explicit algorithm turns out to outperform the symbolic one. To the best of our knowledge, no model checking algorithm for verification of Nash equilibria of mechanisms with coalitions has been previously published.

[1]  K. Eliaz Fault Tolerant Implementation , 2002 .

[2]  Éva Tardos,et al.  The effect of collusion in congestion games , 2006, STOC '06.

[3]  Enrico Tronci,et al.  Model Checking Nash Equilibria in MAD Distributed Systems , 2008, 2008 Formal Methods in Computer-Aided Design.

[4]  Ion Stoica,et al.  Peer-to-Peer Systems II , 2003, Lecture Notes in Computer Science.

[5]  Joan Feigenbaum,et al.  Mechanism design for policy routing , 2004, PODC '04.

[6]  Michael Dahlin,et al.  BAR primer , 2008, 2008 IEEE International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks With FTCS and DCC (DSN).

[7]  Levente Buttyán,et al.  Security and Cooperation in Wireless Networks: Thwarting Malicious and Selfish Behavior in the Age of Ubiquitous Computing , 2007 .

[8]  Stephan Merz,et al.  Model Checking , 2000 .

[9]  Philip Wolfe,et al.  Contributions to the theory of games , 1953 .

[10]  Michael Burrows,et al.  A Cooperative Internet Backup Scheme , 2003, USENIX Annual Technical Conference, General Track.

[11]  Brian D. Noble,et al.  Samsara: honor among thieves in peer-to-peer storage , 2003, SOSP '03.

[12]  Michael Dahlin,et al.  BAR gossip , 2006, OSDI '06.

[13]  H. Everett 2. RECURSIVE GAMES , 1958 .

[14]  Drew Fudenberg,et al.  Game theory (3. pr.) , 1991 .

[15]  Michael Dahlin,et al.  BAR fault tolerance for cooperative services , 2005, SOSP '05.

[16]  Steve Chien,et al.  Convergence to approximate Nash equilibria in congestion games , 2007, SODA '07.

[17]  Mary Baker,et al.  Preserving peer replicas by rate-limited sampled voting , 2003, SOSP '03.

[18]  Christopher Batten,et al.  pStore: A Secure Peer-to-Peer Backup System∗ , 2007 .

[19]  Ratul Mahajan,et al.  Sustaining cooperation in multi-hop wireless networks , 2005, NSDI.

[20]  B. Cohen,et al.  Incentives Build Robustness in Bit-Torrent , 2003 .

[21]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Specification faithfulness in networks with rational nodes , 2004, PODC '04.

[22]  Noam Nisan,et al.  Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract) , 1999, STOC '99.

[23]  Randal E. Bryant,et al.  Graph-Based Algorithms for Boolean Function Manipulation , 1986, IEEE Transactions on Computers.