A Receipt-free Multi-Authority E-Voting System

existing e-voting schemes satisfied requirements such as eligibility, completeness, "no vote duplication", privacy but have not been able to solve the problems of universal verifiability, coercion, bribery and fairness in the overall election process. In this work, a receipt-free multi-authority e-voting system is proposed to solve the drawbacks of the existing e-voting systems is proposed. The proposed scheme employs ElGamal encryption for ensuring the security of votes because of its probabilistic nature. ElGamal which is homomorphic with multiplication is modified to be additive homomorphic in order to ensure voters" privacy and overall election efficiency. A trusted centre is involved in the scheme to distribute the shared secret key among the authorities and the Shamir(t, n) threshold scheme is used for key distribution. The authorities will then use this share secret to decrypt the encrypted ballot. 1-out-of-L re- encryption is used to guarantee receipt-freeness. The proposed scheme is divided into registration, validation, vote casting and tallying phases. The security analysis of the scheme was then carried out to show its effectiveness.

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