ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND:PRICE FIXER TO THE WORLD (Third Edition)

Both market structure and corporate practices of Archer Daniels Midland fostered the implementation of the largest price-fixing conspiracies seen in modern times. The overcharges imposed on U.S. buyers of lysine and citric acid during 1994-1995 by ADM and its co-conspirators amounted to at least $250 million, and the total amount of public penalties, private damages, and legal costs exceeds $740 million. Perpetrators of price-fixing now face monetary exposures that are five times the amount of the harm caused to buyers. These events have spurred renewed attention by U.S. antitrust authorities in prosecuting international cartels.

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