Dynamic Auctions: A Survey

We survey the recent literature on designing auctions and mechanisms for dynamic settings. Two settings are considered: those with a dynamic population of agents or buyers whose private information remains fixed throughout time; and those with a fixed population of agents or buyers whose private information changes across time. Within each of these settings, we discuss both efficient (welfare-maximizing) and optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanisms.

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