Extending Game Theoretic Propositions About Slack and Scarcity in Managerial Decision Making

Game theory proposes that slack makes mean (noncooperative) games kinder (more cooperative) and kind (cooperative) games meaner (less cooperative), while scarcity produces the opposite effects. But, organizational situations generally involve mixtures of kindness (cooperation) and meanness (conflict). A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed motive decision-making experiment varied slack, certainty, and political influence. Results indicate that, when there is slack, kindness pays.

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