论文信息 - Commitment and observability in games - 字舞流文

Commitment and observability in games

[1] H. Stackelberg,et al. Marktform und Gleichgewicht , 1935 .

[2] T. Schelling,et al. The Strategy of Conflict. , 1961 .

[3] David M. Kreps,et al. Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma , 1982 .

[4] J. Brander,et al. International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy , 1983 .

[5] Leonard J. Mirman,et al. Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand , 1983 .

[6] David M. Kreps,et al. Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes , 1983 .

[7] C. Fershtman,et al. Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly , 1984 .

[8] David M. Kreps,et al. On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements , 1988 .

[9] D. Fudenberg,et al. Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed , 1992 .