Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols

Under the assumption that each pair of participants can communicate secretly, we show that any reasonable multiparty protocol can be achieved if at least 2n/3 of the participants are honest. The secrecy achieved is unconditional. It does not rely on any assumption about computational intractability.

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