A reexamination of analysts' earnings forecasts for takeover targets

Abstract We examine analysts' earnings forecasts for a sample of takeover targets and document that the announcement-month forecasts are systematically revised upward, supporting the hypothesis that a takeover announcement conveys favorable information about the target firm. In addition, we find that abnormal forecast revisions of future stand-alone earnings are significantly greater for targets with low Tobin's q-ratios relative to targets with high q-ratios, lending further support to the information hypothesis. Finally, we provide evidence that managerial resistance to the takeover does not destroy value. Our results are in direct contrast to Pound (1988).

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