Capabilities, Perception, and Escalation

The evolution of crises depends upon interpreting intentions under uncertainty. We model crises as a game of two-sided incomplete information. Players are uncertain about their own payoffs from war because of differences between observable and actual capabilities. We derive four hypotheses, testing them against crises in Europe between 1815 and 1970. We show a nonmonotonic relationship between ex ante observable capabilities and the likelihood of violence in a crisis, as well as the ex ante likelihood of a negotiated settlement. We answer five questions: (1) How do differences in observable capabilities between rivals influence the likelihood of a crisis and the escalation to violence? (2) How do intangible capabilities alter the effects of observable capabilities on the likelihood of conflict and violence? (3) What do national leaders learn from the responses of their adversaries in crises? (4) Under what conditions can deterrence succeed? (5) Under what conditions are the strong likely to give in to the weak or vice versa in a crisis?

[1]  R. Powell.  Stability and the Distribution of Power , 1996, World Politics.

[2]  Paul K. Huth.  Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War , 1988 .

[3]  Robert Gilpin,et al.  War and change in world politics , 1982 .

[4]  Bruce Russett,et al.  Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference , 1990, World Politics.

[5]  B. B. D. Mesquita,et al.  How Perceptions Influence the Risk of War , 1995 .

[6]  B. B. D. Mesquita.  Risk, Power Distributions, and the Likelihood of War , 1981 .

[7]  Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,et al.  War and Reason , 1992 .

[8]  D. Lalman.  Conflict Resolution and Peace , 1988 .

[9]  Z. Maoz,et al.  Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976 , 1984 .

[10]  R. Lebow.  Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis , 1982 .

[11]  R. Lebow,et al.  Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable , 1990, World Politics.

[12]  J. Fearon.  Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes , 1994, American Political Science Review.

[13]  J. Kugler,et al.  The War Ledger , 2021, Rebellion, Reconstruction, and Redemption, 1861–1893.

[14]  James D. Fearon,et al.  Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests , 1994 .

[15]  Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,et al.  The War Trap , 1981 .

[16]  Barry Nalebuff,et al.  Credible Pretrial Negotiation , 1987 .

[17]  Bruce Russett,et al.  What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980 , 1984 .

[18]  L. Carlson.  A Theory of Escalation And International Conflict , 1995 .

[19]  W. Moul.  Balances of Power and the Escalation to War of Serious Disputes among the European Great Powers, 1815-1939: Some Evidence , 1988 .

[20]  Robert Powell,et al.  Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD , 1987, American Political Science Review.

[21]  J. Mearsheimer.  Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics , 1989 .

[22]  J. D. Morrow.  On the Theoretical Basis of a Measure of National Risk Attitudes , 1987 .

[23]  R. Jervis.  Perception and misperception in international politics , 1976 .

[24]  R. Gilpin.  War and Change in World Politics: Index , 1981 .

[25]  Harvey Starr,et al.  Conceptualizing “War” , 1983 .

[26]  Bruce Russett,et al.  Peace, war, and numbers , 1972 .

[27]  Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,et al.  Measuring Systemic Polarity , 1975 .

[28]  Jeffrey S. Banks,et al.  Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games , 1990 .

[29]  James D. Morrow,et al.  Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining , 1989 .

[30]  Walter LaFeber,et al.  The White House Years. , 1980 .

[31]  J. Sobel,et al.  Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games , 1987 .

[32]  Peter C. Ordeshook,et al.  Models of strategic choice in politics , 1989 .

[33]  J. Fearon.  Rationalist explanations for war , 1995, International Organization.

[34]  D. Marc Kilgour,et al.  Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence , 1991 .