论文信息 - Time inconsistency and fiscal policy : Empirical analysis of U.S. States, 1969-89

Time inconsistency and fiscal policy : Empirical analysis of U.S. States, 1969-89

Abstract We offer an extensive and robust test of the time-inconsistency theory of fiscal politics. We employ data of U.S. states from 1969 to 1989, and the results of our tests indicate the variables such as legislative stability and executive term limits have strongly predictable impacts on the volatility of various measures of fiscal policy.

Robert D. Tollison | W. Crain | R. Tollison | W. Mark Crain

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