In the absence of contrary information, it would seem prudent for competitors to attribute to their opposition the same level of rationality they attribute to themselves. In the context of a simple but interesting C^3 (command, control, and communication) model presented in Ref. [3], a method is proposed for incorporating symmetrical rationality without resorting to the general multistage game framework which has proved difficult to apply in practice. A technique is suggested for the approximate solution of the resulting C^3 model which does not require integration operations, and which appears to be especially well suited for C^3 problems with finite admissible control sets.
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