论文信息 - Minimum cost forest games

Minimum cost forest games

In this paper we consider a generalization of the minimum cost spanning tree game. The generalized model allows for more than one supplier, where each supplier offers a different type of service to the customers and each customer specifies a non-empty subset of these suppliers to which he wishes to be connected. We show that the core of such a game may be empty, but that it is always non-empty if there is at least one customer who wants to be connected to all suppliers. Furthermore, the core is always non-empty if there are at most two suppliers.

Jeroen Kuipers | J. Kuipers

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