GPS spoofing attack on time synchronization in wireless networks and detection scheme design

In this paper, we introduce a GPS spoofing attack on the time synchronization in wireless networks. As a case study, the frequency hopping code division multiple access (FH-CDMA) based ad hoc network relying on the GPS signal is investigated. The GPS spoofing attack, which is more malicious than other attacks such as jamming, could lead to the loss of network-wide synchronization as well as the loss of synchronization in FH code. The performance degradation in terms of symbol error rate (SER) of the FH-CDMA based ad hoc network under such an attack is evaluated. Then, to detect the spoofing attack efficiently, we propose to employ a quick detection technique, i.e., CUSUM test algorithm, by observing the dynamic range of the successful detection rate. Simulation results show that GPS spoofing attack on network performance is a long-term impact and more pernicious threat compared to the jamming; moreover, our proposed CUSUM scheme is an effective method to detect the GPS spoofing attack.

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