论文信息 - A note on the efficiency and fairness of decentralized matching

A note on the efficiency and fairness of decentralized matching

This note shows by means of simulation experiments that although two-sided matching markets can always converge to a stable outcome via a decentralized process of matching and rematching, the most likely outcome need not be the median matching or a minimum-choice-count matching, whether or not the two coincide.

James W. Boudreau

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