Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members

By parliamentary practice, the members of the committee reporting a bill are granted priority recognition for the purpose of moving amendments. If they seek recognition, the committee members are recognized in order of seniority. We extend the random proposer model of parliamentary bargaining by allowing for priority recognition of T > 1 committee members. In contrast to the T = 1 case considered in the literature, the payoff of the first proposer is not unique if T > 1, and even at the lower bound of the outcome continuum, it is substantially higher than with T = 1. Hence, priority recognition strikingly improves the bargaining power of the proposing committee member, and pure random proposer models overstate predictability and understate bargaining power.

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