Management Control-Systems And The Implementation Of Strategies

This paper studies the role of management control systems in ensuring that managers choose actions desired by the owner. Using an abstract model of a multi-divisional firm, I show that, in general, second-best sharing rules alone do not suffice to implement the owner's desired action choices when divisions interact. I then show that certain commonly observed internal accounting procedures can help implement these actions, at no additional cost to the owner (except, possibly, administrative costs). In particular, a positive role is derived for internal reports and, based on those reports, the formulation of target-based bonus schemes and the allocation of noncontrollable costs. Such procedures are useful because they coordinate the actions of division managers by linking their performance evaluation schemes, over and above the links that arise from the production system. With the control system in place, each manager attempts to maximize his utility by submitting appropriate reports, which in turn inform the owner about the actions of other divisions. Prior work in accounting that has attempted to explain observed internal control phenomena includes Baiman and Evans [ 1983], who