论文信息 - A note on allocations attainable through nash equilibria

A note on allocations attainable through nash equilibria

Abstract This note reexamines the issue of attaining efficient resource allocations as noncooperative equilibria of a strategic game. Contrary to the spirit of earlier work on this subject, it is shown that there is an entire class of choice rules, aside from the Walrasian one, which are implementable in Nash equilibrium stategies.

Stefan Reichelstein

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