A heuristic for estimating Nash equilibria in first-price auctions with correlated values

Our paper concerns the computation of Nash equilibria of first-price auctions with correlated values. While there exist several equilibrium computation methods for auctions with independent values, the correlation of the bidders’ values introduces significant complications that render existing methods unsatisfactory in practice. Our contribution is a step towards filling this gap: inspired by the seminal fictitious play process of Brown and Robinson, we present a learning heuristic – that we call fictitious bidding (FB) – for estimating BayesNash equilibria of first-price auctions with correlated values, and we assess the performance of this heuristic on several relevant examples.

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