Modeling Cyber-Physical Vulnerability of the Smart Grid With Incomplete Information

This paper addresses the attack modeling using vulnerability of information, communication and electric grid network. Vulnerability of electric grid with incomplete information has been analyzed using graph theory based approach. Vulnerability of information and communication (cyber) network has been modeled utilizing concepts of discovery, access, feasibility, communication speed and detection threat. Common attack vector based on vulnerability of cyber and physical system have been utilized to operate breakers associated with generating resources to model aurora-like event. Real time simulations for modified IEEE 14 bus test case system and graph theory analysis for IEEE 118 bus system have been presented. Test case results show the possible impact on smart grid caused by integrated cyber-physical attack.

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