The Problem of Independence in Justification by Coherence

Independence in the formation of cognitive mental states plays a crucial role in many accounts of their justification by coherence. Since most epistemologists who take strong interest in justification by coherence are internalists, the requirement of independence gives rise to the problem of whether independence in the formation of cognitive states can be confirmed by internal evidence alone. I shall point out first that in light of the independence requirement beliefs are not a good candidate for justification by coherence since they are formed under the coherence constraint. Appearances are a better candidate. I shall then propose two tests of independence in the formation of cognitive states. One of them, the selective coherence test, has some limitation. It can confirm independence only when some cognitive states are coherent because of the reliability of their formation while others are coherent because of the lack of independence. The other test, the complexity test, can con.firm independence even when there is no such division, but it is inconsistent with the strict form of internal ism in epistemology. The complexity test requires that the internalist restriction on epistemic justification be weakened.