Asymmetric contests with general technologies

Summary.We investigate the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of asymmetric, winner-take-all, imperfectly discriminating contests, focussing on existence, uniqueness and rent dissipation. When the contest success function is determined by a production function with decreasing returns for each contestant, there is a unique pure-strategy equilibrium. If marginal product is also bounded, limiting total expenditure is equal to the value of the prize in large contests even if contestants differ. Partial dissipation occurs only when infinite marginal products are permitted. Our analysis relies heavily on the use of ‘share functions’ and we discuss their theory and application.

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