论文信息 - Implementation in Dominant Strategies Under Complete and Incomplete Information (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, LII (1985), pp.223-229.)

Implementation in Dominant Strategies Under Complete and Incomplete Information (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, LII (1985), pp.223-229.)

This paper shows that if a social choice rule can be implemented in dominant strategies by an indirect mechanism, but there does not exist a direct mechanism that implements it in dominant strategies, then it must be the case that the original indirect mechanism does not implement the social choice rule in Nash strategies (under complete information) or in Bayesian strategies (under imcomplete information).

Rafael Repullo

[1] J. Harsanyi. Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points , 1968 .

[2] E. Maskin,et al. The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility , 1979 .