To Share or Not to Share: Demand Forecast Sharing in a Distribution Channel

This paper studies information sharing in a distribution channel where the manufacturer possesses better demand-forecast information than the downstream retailer. We examine three information-sharing formats: no information sharing (i.e., the manufacturer ex ante commits to not sharing its forecast), voluntary information sharing (i.e., the manufacturer makes the sharing decision ex post after receiving the forecast), and mandatory information sharing (i.e., the manufacturer is mandated to share its forecast). We characterize the equilibrium outcomes under the three sharing formats and investigate the firms’ preferences regarding these formats. It is shown that when the retailer is risk-neutral, both firms are indifferent between voluntary and mandatory sharing. Among the three formats, ex ante, the retailer prefers the no-sharing format whereas the manufacturer prefers the mandatory-sharing format. In addition, we find that a more accurate forecast benefits both firms under voluntary- and mandatory-shari...

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