Elections and Durable Governments in Parliamentary Democracies

This paper provides a theory of a parliamentary government system with proportional representation elections and policy-motivated parties and voters. In a symmetric, spatial model governments are majoritarian, they and their policies are durable, and voters elect minority parliaments in every period. A continuum of (Markov) political equilibria exist with policies that represent concessions to centrist voters. In these equilibria the parties in a majoritarian government are equal partners. The greater the concession the more politically patient the parties must be for an equilibrium to exist. If one party is more centrally-located in the space of voter preferences, it can receive a majority and choose its ideal policy. If officeholding benefits are available, the policy of a durable government favors the head of government and changes when the head changes. In the elections the out party loses half its vote share to one of the government parties because rather than waste their votes. If crises can occur, governments can fall, but a new government forms after the next election. If crises are sufficiently frequent, no political equilibrium exists. ∗655 Knight Way, Stanford CA 94305. dbaron@stanford.edu. (650)723-3757 (P), (650) 724-9649 (F).

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