Economic Analyses of Security Investments on Cryptocurrency Exchanges

Cryptocurrency exchanges are frequently targeted and compromised by cyber-attacks, which may lead to significant losses for the depositors and closure of the affected exchanges. These risks threaten the viability of the entire public blockchain ecosystem since exchanges serve as major gateways for participation in public blockchain technologies. In this paper, we develop an economic model to capture the short-term incentives of cryptocurrency exchanges with respect to making security investments and establishing transaction fees. Using the model, we derive conclusions regarding an exchange's optimal economic decisions, and illustrate key features of these conclusions using graphs based on real-world data. Our security investment model exhibits horizontal scaling properties with respect to reducing exposure to losses, and may be of special interest to exchanges operating in markets with high price volatility.

[1]  Jeremy Clark,et al.  Provisions: Privacy-preserving Proofs of Solvency for Bitcoin Exchanges , 2015, CCS.

[2]  P. Molnár,et al.  Price Discovery on Bitcoin Exchanges , 2015 .

[3]  Jeffrey S. Rosenschein,et al.  Bitcoin Mining Pools: A Cooperative Game Theoretic Analysis , 2015, AAMAS.

[4]  Neil Gandal,et al.  Price Manipulation in the Bitcoin Ecosystem , 2017 .

[5]  Tyler Moore,et al.  The impact of DDoS and other security shocks on Bitcoin currency exchanges: evidence from Mt. Gox , 2017, J. Cybersecur..

[6]  Ladislav Kristoufek,et al.  What Are the Main Drivers of the Bitcoin Price? Evidence from Wavelet Coherence Analysis , 2014, PloS one.

[7]  Nicolas Houy,et al.  It Will Cost You Nothing to 'Kill' a Proof-of-Stake Crypto-Currency , 2014 .

[8]  Levente Buttyán,et al.  A Survey of Interdependent Information Security Games , 2014, ACM Comput. Surv..

[9]  Satoshi Nakamoto Bitcoin : A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System , 2009 .

[10]  T. Moore,et al.  Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and Governance , 2014 .

[11]  Aron Laszka,et al.  When Bitcoin Mining Pools Run Dry - A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Long-Term Impact of Attacks Between Mining Pools , 2015, Financial Cryptography Workshops.

[12]  Tyler Moore,et al.  Game-Theoretic Analysis of DDoS Attacks Against Bitcoin Mining Pools , 2014, Financial Cryptography Workshops.

[13]  Emin Gün Sirer,et al.  Majority is not enough , 2013, Financial Cryptography.

[14]  Kai Zimmermann,et al.  Bitcoin - Asset or Currency? Revealing Users' Hidden Intentions , 2014, ECIS.

[15]  Samvit Jain,et al.  Determining an optimal threshold on the online reserves of a bitcoin exchange , 2018, J. Cybersecur..

[16]  Joshua A. Kroll,et al.  The Economics of Bitcoin Mining, or Bitcoin in the Presence of Adversaries , 2013 .

[17]  Jeremy Clark,et al.  SoK: Research Perspectives and Challenges for Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies , 2015, 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.

[18]  Christian Decker,et al.  Making Bitcoin Exchanges Transparent , 2015, ESORICS.

[19]  Tyler Moore,et al.  Revisiting the Risks of Bitcoin Currency Exchange Closure , 2018, ACM Trans. Internet Techn..

[20]  Neil Gandal,et al.  Can We Predict the Winner in a Market with Network Effects? Competition in Cryptocurrency Market , 2016, Games.

[21]  Tyler Moore,et al.  Beware the Middleman: Empirical Analysis of Bitcoin-Exchange Risk , 2013, Financial Cryptography.