论文信息 - Achieving the first best in sequencing problems

Achieving the first best in sequencing problems

Abstract. In a sequencing problem with linear time cost, Suijs (1996) proved that it is possible to achieve first best. By first best we mean that one can find mechanisms that satisfy efficiency of decision, dominant strategy incentive compatibility and budget balancedness. In this paper we show that among a more general and natural class of sequencing problems, sequencing problems with linear cost is the only class for which first best can be achieved.

Manipushpak Mitra | Manipushpak Mitra

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