Who Controls Whom? An Examination of the Relation Between Management and Boards of Directors in Large American Corporations

Most organization theorists believe that boards of directors in large American corporations are dominated by management. This paper argues that this view is based on a problematic definition of control. Several distinctions between long run and short run control are presented, and a framework in which boards of directors have control over managers is suggested. Case examples are given and possible objections are confronted. Finally, an agenda for further research on board-management relations is offered.

[1]  M. Mizruchi,et al.  The Transfer of Control in Large Corporations: 1905-1919 , 1982 .

[2]  M. Mizruchi,et al.  The American Corporate Network 1904-1974 , 1982 .

[3]  E. Herman.  Corporate Control, Corporate Power , 1982 .

[4]  Mark S. Mizruchi,et al.  Influence in Corporate Networks: An Examination of Four Measures. , 1981 .

[5]  Max H. Bazerman,et al.  Interlocking Directorates: A Strategy for Reducing Environmental Uncertainty , 1981 .

[6]  David R. James,et al.  Profit Constraints on Managerial Autonomy: Managerial Theory and the Unmaking of the Corporation President , 1981 .

[7]  Lawrence R. Jauch,et al.  TOP MANAGEMENT UNDER FIRE , 1981 .

[8]  John Scott,et al.  Corporations, Classes and Capitalism , 1980 .

[9]  L. Preston.  Running the American Corporation , 1979 .

[10]  D. Kotz.  Bank Control of Large Corporations in the United States , 1978 .

[11]  Meindert Fennema,et al.  Analysing interlocking directorates: Theory and methods☆ , 1978 .

[12]  S. Lukes.  Power: A Radical View , 1974 .

[13]  Maurice Zeitlin,et al.  Corporate Ownership and Control: The Large Corporation and the Capitalist Class , 1974, American Journal of Sociology.

[14]  D. Bell.  The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society , 1973 .

[15]  P. Sweezy,et al.  The Resurgence of Financial Control: Fact or Fancy? , 1971 .

[16]  Myles L. Mace,et al.  Directors: Myth and Reality , 1971 .

[17]  James Burnham,et al.  The managerial revolution , 1941 .

[18]  Mayer N. Zald,et al.  The Power and Functions of Boards of Directors: A Theoretical Synthesis , 1969, American Journal of Sociology.

[19]  W. N. Leonard.  Business size, market power, and public policy , 1969 .

[20]  John Kenneth Galbraith,et al.  The New Industrial State , 1968 .

[21]  J. Juran,et al.  The Corporate Director , 1966 .

[22]  Stanley Young,et al.  Management : a systems analysis , 1966 .

[23]  O. Williamson.  The economics of discretionary behavior : managerial objectives in a theory of the firm , 1965 .

[24]  R. Marris.  The economic theory of "managerial" capitalism , 1964 .

[25]  P. Bachrach,et al.  Two Faces of Power , 1962, American Political Science Review.

[26]  P. Baran,et al.  Monopoly Capital: Introduction , 1962 .

[27]  Talcott Parsons,et al.  Structure and Process in Modern Societies , 1961 .

[28]  William J. Baumol,et al.  Business Behavior, Value, and Growth , 1960 .

[29]  D. Bell.  The End of Ideology , 1960 .

[30]  R. Dahrendorf,et al.  Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society , 1960 .

[31]  Eugene V. Rostow.  3 to whom and for what ends is corporate management responsible , 1959 .

[32]  E. Mason.  The corporation in modern society , 1959 .

[33]  Philip Selznick.  Leadership in administration , 1957 .

[34]  D. Riesman,et al.  The Lonely Crowd. , 1951 .

[35]  Shorey Peterson,et al.  The Modern Corporation and Private Property. , 1933 .