3. Perceived risk, trust, and nuclear waste: lessons from yucca mountain

By the year 2000, the U nited States will have a projected 40,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel stored and awaiting disposal at some seventy sites. By 2035, after all existing nuclear plants have completed forty years of operation, there will be approximately 85,000 metric tons (Technical Re­ view Board, 1991). The amount of spent fuel needing disposal will continue to grow with the relicensing of existing nuclear plants and the possible con­ struction of new facilities. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has been under intense pressure from Congress and the nuclear industry to dispose of this accumulating volume of high-level waste since the passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1982 and its amendment in 1987, by which Yucca Mountain, Nevada, was selected as the only candidate site for the nation's first nuclear waste repository. The lack of a suitable solution to the waste problem is widely viewed as an obstacle to further development of nuclear pow!:lr and a threat to the continued operation of existing reactors, besides being a safety hazard in its own right. Yet, to this time, the DOE program has been stymied by overwhelming political opposition, fueled by perceptions of the public that the risks are immense (Flynn et al., 1990; Kasperson, 1990; Kunreuther, Desvousges, and Slavic, 1988; Nealey and Hebert, 1983; and this volume). These perceptions stand in stark contrast to the prevailing view of the technical community, which believes that nuclear wastes can be disposed of safely, in deep un,der­ ground isola!ion. Officials from DOE, the nuclear industry, and technical experts are profoundly puzzled, frustrated, and disturbed by the public and political opposition, which many of them believe is based upon irrationality and ignorance (see Table 3-1). A number of important events ·during the past several years und�rscore the seriousness of this problem.