Noncomputational Approaches to Mitigating Computational Problems in Combinatorial Auctions

16.1 Introduction Hikers encountering a fallen tree blocking a trail can climb over it, cut a path through it, or walk around it. In general, obstacles can be overcome, reduced, or avoided. Often, reducing the obstacle or avoiding it is a preferable choice. The computational problems in combinatorial auctions are no different. The previous four chapters have been largely devoted to describing ways of overcoming them. While it is important to have the ability to overcome unavoidable computational difficulties, good combinatorial auction design will certainly want to take advantage of appropriate ways to reduce or avoid them. That is the topic of this chapter. This section of this chapter sets the context by reviewing briefly the computational issues in combinatorial auction design, the context of auction design including the information available to the designer, and properties that the auction designer must trade off in selecting the auction format and procedures. The following

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